covers a lot of ground, but perhaps I may be allowed to make two supplementary observations.
Much has been said about the problematic ethical, moral and legal issues raised by this concept. Problematic, but not unsolvable. I like to think of the reciprocal scenario. Suppose that until now all human babies had come into existence as a result of cloning. Then, in March 1999, scientists announce an amazing discovery: there is a novel way of creating babies, the key step being a process which they name sexual intercourse. This announcement provokes a familiar outcry. First: 'Yuk!'. Then: 'Insuperable ethical, legal and moral difficulties! The child would suffer unimaginable confusion if it discovered that two people had contributed to its creation. And having to divide its loyalties between two parents would result in serious psychological problems. Think of the distress the child would experience if the two people responsible for its existence were to split up. And what would the legal position be if a couple produced a baby despite the fact that one of the partners had not explicitly consented to do so?' And: 'There would be unacceptable biological risks and uncertainties. People could no longer be certain of starting a baby exactly when they wanted to. The determination of the offspring's sex would be completely random. Moreover, the child would be at risk of suffering all kinds of abnormalities by possessing two copies of recessive defective genes.' And so on. In reality, society has been able to develop fairly adequate means for coping with these complex issues, so we need not feel too pessimistic about our ability to tackle new, but not totally unrelated, issues in the future.
In response to the Brave New World scenario in which an unscrupulous dictator embarks on a cloning programme as a means to a reprehensible end, there is the obvious point that any legislation to prohibit or restrict cloning (on whatever grounds) is likely to be powerless to prevent a dictatorial regime, ipsofacto, from doing whatever it wishes. So to give Huxley's nightmare any weight as an argument against a regulated cloning programme in an open and democratic society would be like arguing for a ban on, say, organ transplantation on the same grounds. This is not to belittle the many genuine difficulties associated with human reproductive cloning nor the need for decisions to be taken with the utmost caution and in the context of a continuing open debate. A B Stone 38 Hollycroft Avenue, London NW3 7QN, UK Post-traumatic stress disorder Dr Field finds that almost every medicolegal report prepared by a psychiatrist or psychologist instructed on behalf of a plaintiff in personal injury litigation will conclude that he or she is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), irrespective of the severity of the accident . . . . How surprising, then, that almost every such report on behalf of a defendant concludes precisely the opposite. Perhaps his indignation should be directed against the present adversarial system of expert witnesses, and we should change to the Dutch system of an independent consultant. If we did, I suspect that plaintiffs would come off much better than the insurance companies.
However, Dr Field's paper not only contains many unscientific statements, but is not notable for its sympathy towards the usually innocent victims of accidents, some of whom have their lives irretrievably ruined. He regrets the 'wholesale adoption by British psychiatrists' of the diagnosis of PTSD as an 'importation from the United States'. In other words, that the condition was unknown here before the publication of DSM-III in 1980. This is simply not the case. Some years before that, I and other British psychiatrists were regularly identifying the disorder in accident victims, though it lacked a suitable name. Sometimes, courts would acknowledge its existence and award compensation, in spite of the fact that virtually the only published work on the subject was Miller's two 1961 papers on 'accident neurosis'1. These claimed to have shown that post-traumatic psychiatric symptoms always disappeared following the settlement of legal proceedings. How these data were obtained remains a mystery, since every reliable piece of research since then has obtained totally different results. However, the malign influence of Miller's opinion dominated the field for many years, denying many accident victims their well-deserved compensation.
Dr Field tries to wipe away the disorder by semantic sleight-of-hand, neglecting the fact that co-morbidity with other conditions is often present. But the real existence of this condition is a complex scientific issue, in which knowledge is constantly developing2. For instance, there is now significant evidence of neuro-endocrine abnormalities underlying PTSD, which helps to explain the often enduring symptoms. O'Brien3 points out that, in terms of face validity, descriptive validity, predictive validity, and construct validity, PTSD remains a robust entity.
The suggestion that plaintiffs 'have ideas put into their heads' by sympathetic psychiatrists is unworthy of serious consideration. Experienced clinicians only have to allow accident victims the opportunity to express themselves freely; many will then describe being bullied and browbeaten by defendants' experts, adding to their existing distress.
